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ALIVE BUT IRRELEVANT:
THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
IN TODAYS WESTERN WATER LAW
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D. BENSON*

The Prior Appropriation Doctrine has long been the
foundation of laws governing water allocation and use in the
American West, but it has been under pressure from forces
both external and internal to the western states. Twenty
years ago, Prior Appropriation was pronounced dead in a
provocative essay by Charles Wilkinson. Other scholars
argued that it was still alive, but it now appears to have lost
its force as the controlling doctrine of western water law.
This Article analyzes three recent cases upholding state laws
that undermine a fundamental Prior Appropriation
principle, then considers the water policy implications of the
western states'departurefrom PriorAppropriation.
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INTRODUCTION

The Prior Appropriation Doctrine appeared in the water
law of the western United States in 1855 when the California
Supreme Court applied the rules of the frontier mining camps
to a water dispute between miners who had staked their claims
on public lands.1 Thus, Prior Appropriation (PA) was adopted,
rather than born, in the water law context. But PA was soon
embraced by the courts and legislatures of the western states
and territories. 2 Several interior western states even enshrined
PA in their state constitutions. 3 And most of the western states
adopted fairly comprehensive water codes in the late
nineteenth or early twentieth century, 4 largely codifying PA
principles with certain modifications.
The central idea of PA is that a person who applies water
to a useful purpose, or "beneficial use," 5 thereby acquires a
right to use enough water to serve that purpose. The earliest
* Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author acknowledges
the fine scholars cited herein-including Michael Blumm, David Getches, Gregory
Hobbs, Janet Neuman, Dan Tarlock, and Charles Wilkinson-who have
eloquently debated the meaning, utility, and viability of Prior Appropriation.
Although none of these six contributed directly to this piece, they have all assisted
the author both personally and intellectually over the years. The author is
especially grateful for all the help, support, and inspiration he received from the
late David Getches, longtime professor and dean at the University of Colorado
Law School, and one of the greatest voices for reform of western water law.
1. See Charles Wilkinson, Introduction to the Cultureof Water Symposium, 6
Wyo. L. REV. 287, 288 (2006) (briefly telling the story of the leading case of Irwin
v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855)).
2. See Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution
of Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest
Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 349-51 (1989).
3. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 11.02(d) n.56 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K.
Kelley eds., LexisNexis/Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2010) (citing constitutional
provisions from Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, and
Wyoming).
4. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 2, at 352 (noting enactment of
statutes in fifteen western states from 1890 through 1919).
5. See Christine A. Klein, The Constitutional Mythology of Western Water
Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 349 (1995) (describing beneficial use as "the
constitutional hallmark of a water right" under prior appropriation, but noting
that state constitutions do not fully define the term, leaving it with a "flexible
meaning" that can reflect current priorities).
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uses give rise to the best rights, as "senior" rights take priority
over "junior" ones at times when water supplies are insufficient
to satisfy all users. 6 These PA principles strongly encouraged
people to take water from its natural course and put it to use at
the earliest possible date. Thus, by the early twentieth century,
many western rivers were "fully appropriated" during the
growing season-that is, irrigators and other users had already
obtained rights to as much (or more) water than the river
typically carried in the summer and fall months.7
By allocating so much of the region's limited water early
on, and by giving top priority to the oldest uses, PA was sure to
come under pressure as the West changed during the twentieth
century. And indeed the pressure came from diverse forces,
such as explosive population growth in many western states,
assertion of water right claims for federal and tribal lands, and
demands for water to serve long-neglected environmental
purposes. 8 Scholars warned that unless the western states
moved to reform their water laws to address these pressures,
the system of private water rights might be jeopardized. 9
Twenty years ago, Charles Wilkinson-a leading western
water scholar and advocate for reform-pronounced PA dead in
a memorable "In Memoriam" essay.10 Wilkinson gave human
life to the PA doctrine in the form of an old-school but
indefatigable western character named Prior Appropriation,
and the essay largely told the life story of Prior and his wife
Ramona.II The essay announced that Prior had died in 1991 of
a heart attack over Denver's decision to accept the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's veto of a permit for the
6. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 108 (4th ed. 2009).
7. See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have
Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States'Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
3, 9-10 (2001).
8. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 2, at 352-76 (describing various
factors influencing the development of western water law).
9. For example, David Getches wrote that Colorado water law had to provide
greater protection to public values, and that it could do so while protecting those
"attributes of Colorado's present system that have served private water allocation
needs. Inaction is the greatest enemy of the system because it will license the
courts and others to impose remedies that may be incompatible with private
rights. Federal agencies may also attempt to fill the policy vacuum." David H.
Getches, Pressures for Change in Western Water Policy, in WATER AND THE
AMERICAN WEST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RAPHAEL J. MOSES 143, 161 (David H.
Getches ed., 1988).
10. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam, Prior Appropriation,
1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L., at v (1991).
11. Id.
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city's proposed Two Forks Dam.12 It noted, however, that Prior
had been in failing health for many reasons, including
environmental demands for water, the end of the federal dambuilding era, and the adoption of state laws providing legal
protection for water left to flow in its natural course.13
Wilkinson's entertaining and provocative essay prompted a
lively academic debate over the ongoing viability of PA, led by
Michael Blumm and Gregory Hobbs.14 Several years later, Dan
Tarlock wrote that reports of Prior's death were premature.
"The system is not dead. Rather the question is its continuing
relevance"I 5-relevance that PA had maintained by constantly
evolving to meet the needs of a changing West.16
Twenty years after his obituary, is crusty old Prior still
alive and well? I would suggest that he is not actually dead,' 7
but that he has lost his practical relevance. Western water law
has indeed evolved, and that evolution continues to move the
law further from the most fundamental PA principles of
beneficial use and priority. 18 The law today consists of statutes
and rules that remain consistent with certain aspects of PA,
but increasingly deviate from its core principles, even in states

12. See id. at xvi. Wilkinson tied Prior's demise to an action by a federal
agency, applying federal environmental law, to block a water supply project that
had valid, longstanding water rights under state law. Id.; see also Daniel F.
Luecke, Two Forks: The Rise and Fall of a Dam, 14 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 24 (1999)
(telling the story of the controversial Two Forks Dam permit veto by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency).
13. Wilkinson, supra note 10. Wilkinson listed many factors contributing to
Prior's death (and several parentheticals with Prior's pithy comments about
them), including:
Indian water settlements ("They don't deserve a single drop.").
Environmentalists-just the mere existence of them. Academics who
relentlessly criticized Prior's ideas ("The bastards wouldn't know the real
world from a beachball."). Federal reserved water rights. State water
planning ("We've got a plan. It's called 'first in time, first in right.' "). An
especially cruel blow was when they adopted an instream flow
program-in Utah.
Id. at xvii.
14. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the
Bundle, 32 ENVTL. L. 37, 38-41 (2002).
15. A. Dan Tarlock, PriorAppropriation:Rule, Principle,or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D.
L. REV. 881, 894 (2000).
16. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Futureof PriorAppropriationin the New West, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 770 (2001).
17. Perhaps, like the hero Westley in the 1987 movie THE PRINCESS BRIDE
(Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 1987), he is only "mostly dead."
18. See Tarlock, supra note 16, at 770-71 (noting that PA's "basic principles,
priority and beneficial use, have remained constant").
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with PA language in their constitutions.19 In these states
especially, PA retains its exalted status but has largely lost its
legal power. The aged Prior is like the now-feeble patriarch
who founded a family business, and although he retains the
title of president and his giant portrait hangs prominently in
the boardroom, he no longer controls the company. The new
managers do things their own way, and while they still honor
some of old Prior's policies, they do so based on their own
choices rather than his presence. He is not dead, but the
enterprise would function much the same if he were-and so it
is today with PA and water in the West.
This Article begins by identifying the most fundamental
PA principles, both under the original common-law doctrine
and under western water codes based on PA. Part II describes
the forces, ranging from federal law requirements to population
growth and environmental demands, that have put PA under
pressure in the modern West. Part III then analyzes recent
cases from Idaho, Washington, and New Mexico demonstrating
how western water law is increasingly moving away from basic
PA principles, with judicial approval. Part IV concludes by
asking if the western states' departure from PA is good or bad
from a water policy standpoint.
I.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE

This Part focuses on what PA is, summarizing some of the
original principles and the ways they have been revised by
statute. It begins, however, with a brief mention of what it is
not: the riparian rights doctrine, which governed water use
across the U.S. at the time of westward expansion. Riparian
rights to use water arise from ownership of land alongside a
natural stream or lake. 20 Every riparian landowner enjoys a
right to make "reasonable" use of water, and although many
factors are relevant to a determination of whether a particular
use is reasonable, a key criterion is whether that use would
harm or destroy another riparian owner's use. 21 All owners
along a watercourse have equal rights as against each other,
19. Christine Klein has identified ten western states with constitutional
provisions regarding prior appropriation, although some are more specific than
others in requiring that water allocation be based on PA. See Klein, supra note 5,
at 347 & n.22.
20. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
21. See GETCHES, supra note 6, at 34-37.
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and all reasonable uses of water on riparian lands are also
considered equal (except for certain small uses which enjoy a
preference). 22 For the most part, then, no user is "first in right"
under the riparian rights doctrine, and all riparian owners may
use water in a way that is reasonable.
The western states and territories rejected riparian rights
early on, viewing the old common-law doctrine as unsuited to
the realities of a region short on both water and economic
activity. 23 They perceived a need for a new allocation regime
that would promote the use of water for productive enterprises
such as mining and irrigation, and they believed that PA would
facilitate and encourage such uses. 24 Eager to promote
settlement and development, the early West turned to PA to
promote an all-important goal: maximum beneficial use of the
resource.
A.

OriginalFundamentals

Given this imperative to put water to work, it is not
surprising that PA's bedrock principle is that beneficial use is
"the basis, the measure and limit of [a water] right."25 Most
fundamentally, PA awards water rights to those who apply
water to a specific beneficial use-that is, some purpose that
the law regards as productive or useful. 26 Water rights are
measured by beneficial use because the quantity of the right is
primarily determined by the amount of water needed for that
use. And because no one who uses water for a particular use
can obtain a right to more water than is fairly required for that
use, beneficial use is also the limit of a water right.27 Thus, if a
22. See id. (small uses such as water supply for household and garden use).
23. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704
(1899) (explaining how mining and irrigation needs for water in the early West
"compelled a departure from the common law rule, and justified an appropriation
of flowing waters both for mining purposes and for the reclamation of arid lands").
24. See id. (describing western states' choice of prior appropriation to serve
mining and irrigation needs); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-48
(1882) (stating policy rationale for refusing to recognize riparian rights in
Colorado).
25. 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(c)(4)(A) (emphasis
added).
26. Traditional beneficial uses would include irrigation, mining, domestic,
manufacturing, and hydropower generation. See Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of
Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 927-28 (Idaho 1974) (discussing Idaho constitutional
provision listing those five beneficial uses, but holding that the list is not
exclusive).
27. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2).
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farmer diverts water from a stream and uses it to irrigate his
hundred-acre pasture, he will obtain a water right for the
purpose of irrigating that specific parcel. The quantity of right
will be no greater than the amount actually diverted for that
purpose, and it may be less if the actual diversion exceeds what

is reasonably needed to irrigate those one hundred acres.
This foundational principle of beneficial use has many
implications for water rights under PA, but two corollary
principles are worth noting here. First, because water rights
are measured and limited by beneficial use, no one has a right
to waste water-that is, to take more water than needed for the
specific use that gave rise to the right, or to use water in a way
that would not serve that beneficial purpose. 28 Statutes in at
least nine states explicitly prohibit waste as part of the bedrock
principle, stating that "beneficial use, without waste, is the
basis, measure, and limit of . . . water right[s]. "29 Second,

because water rights are based on beneficial use, they may be
lost if water is not actually applied to beneficial use for an
extended period. This "use it or lose it" feature may not be an
obvious outgrowth of the foundational beneficial use principle,
but it shows the extent to which PA has been designed to serve
the goal of promoting water use. 30
Another original PA principle is the diversion requirement:
for most purposes, a would-be user must divert water from its
natural course or location in order to establish a right.3 1 In
rejecting a non-diversionary appropriation for flows to support
fish and recreation, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that
"the rule is elementary that the first essential of an
appropriation is the actual diversion of the water with intent to
apply to a beneficial use." 32 The rule is not absolute, however,
as the same court five years earlier had recognized an
appropriation for livestock watering even though water had

28. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The
Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 933
(1998).
29. See id. at 923-24, 924 n.12.
30. See id. at 928-33.
31. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12 .02(c)(1).
32. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co.,
406 P.2d 798, 800 (Colo. 1965) (quoting City & Cnty. of Denver v. N. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 998 (Colo. 1954)).
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never been diverted, reasoning that diversion was less
important than beneficial use. 33
Perhaps the most familiar original PA principle, however,
is first in time, first in right.34 Whereas the riparian rights
doctrine gave every owner of riparian land-old or new, large
or small-an equal right to "reasonable" use of water, PA
establishes a firm and specific hierarchy among users. 35
Roughly speaking, the earliest beneficial uses obtain the most
senior rights. In times of shortage those with senior rights are
allowed to continue taking their full allotment of water, while
those with junior rights must reduce or halt their uses in order
to leave water for their "elders."36 While the priority principle
can lead to harsh results as some users are cut off entirely
while others continue getting their full supply, that result is
fully consistent with the original design of PA and should be
generally expected in a region where PA has been the
foundation of water law for over a century.37
B.

Statutory Refinements

Beginning with Wyoming in 1890, the western states
began enacting statutes that altered the traditional PA
system. 38 Most significantly, these statutes required that
anyone seeking to commence a new water use must first apply
to a state agency and obtain a permit authorizing that use. 39
They established a process for permit applications, including
notice to other water users and an opportunity to object. 40
These permitting statutes also imposed substantive standards
for the approval of applications: most commonly and

33. See Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 349 P.2d 370, 378 (Colo. 1960) (stating
diversion "is not necessary in every case," and that "[t]he only indispensable
requirements are that the appropriator intends to use the waters for a beneficial
purpose and actually applies them to that use").
34. See Tarlock, supra note 15, at 881 (calling this principle "the central
dogma of western water law").
35. See GETCHES, supra note 6, at 108.
36. See Tarlock, supra note 15, at 882.
37. See id. at 885-86.
38. See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 2, at 352.
39. See id. Colorado is now the only state that allows new appropriations to
proceed without a permit, although it provides for "conditional water rights"
which fulfill many of the same purposes as a permit. See 2 WATERS & WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.05.
40. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(a).
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importantly, 4 1 a new permit would be denied if there was no
unappropriated water available or if the proposed use would
adversely affect existing water rights.42 The effect of these
laws, then, was to allow for new, junior, water rights, while
providing both procedural and substantive protection to senior
rights. 43
The statutes provide that a permit is an authorization to
use water in accordance with its terms, but it is not a complete
and final water right.44 In order to obtain a full-fledged water
right, the permit holder must actually apply water to a
beneficial use in accordance with the permit terms and prove

such use to the state agency. In other words, a permit
represents only an inchoate right to use water and is never
''perfected" until the state agency determines actual beneficial
use45 and issues a document (commonly called a certificate)
confirming the right. 46
Permitting, however, is only one of many responsibilities
that state agencies received (and still bear) under the western
water codes. Perhaps the most important duty is to administer
existing water rights by priority-regulating water use by
junior users to ensure that senior users receive the water they
are due in times of shortage.47 In response to a "call" by a water
41. Another common statutory standard is that the proposed use must not
impair the public interest. See id. § 15.03(c)(3). I tend, however, to discount the
practical importance of public interest standards. In practice, state agencies seem
to base permitting decisions chiefly on factors such as water availability and harm
to other users, while public interest standards rarely play more than a minor role.
See, e.g., Amber L. Weeks, Defining the Public Interest: Administrative Narrowing
and Broadening of the Public Interest in Response to the Statutory Silence of Water
Codes, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 272 (2010) (describing Nevada State Engineer's
practice of applying the public interest narrowly, as essentially restating
requirements of traditional state water law).
42. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(c)(1)-(2).
43.

See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 308 (6th ed.

2009) ("Virtually all water laws prevent new rights from being recognized or
permits being granted if it would harm vested rights. This is the most
fundamental way of protecting priorities. A related requirement is that there be
water available for appropriation before a water right will be granted.").
44. See GETCHES, supra note 6, at 153.
45. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(d). "To perfect an
appropriation in any prior appropriation state, ... water must actually be put to a
beneficial use." Id. § 15.03(d)(1).
46. See GETCHES, supra note 6, at 154.
47. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-3-2 (1978) (authorizing the state engineer to
appoint water masters having "immediate charge of the apportionment of waters"
in a defined district, subject to state engineer oversight); GETCHES, supra note 6,
at 163-64 (describing Wyoming system of administration by water commissioners
employed by the State Engineer).
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user with a priority date of, say, 1905, a state official in the
field (commonly called a watermaster or water commissioner)
orders users junior to 1905 to stop diverting so as to satisfy the
caller's right. 48 In carrying out this duty, the state agency has
some discretion in deciding when regulation is needed but has
limited authority to deny a call when enforcing it would result
in satisfaction of the senior right.49
Priority administration may be stymied, however, by the
existence of water rights that pre-date the state water code.
Where a person has actually and continuously applied water to
a beneficial use, there is almost certainly a valid right, but its
priority date and quantity are undetermined and may be
disputed. To determine these pre-code rights, the statutes
provide for general stream adjudications, which are massive,
complex cases whereby all the valid older water rights in a
particular river basin are confirmed and quantified.50 Some
states have essentially completed adjudication of their major
river basins, but several major adjudications are ongoing, 51 and
some-including the complicated Middle Rio Grande in New
Mexico-have not yet begun.
As the preceding paragraph suggests, PA, in its most basic
form, addresses two rather different things: water allocation
and water use regulation. PA allocates water by setting the
rules for the creation and recognition of water rights, and
although permitting statutes have introduced new criteria for
approval, the ultimate requirement for a water right has
always been beneficial use. 52 PA also governs water use under
established rights by providing a clear rule-first in time, first
in right-that dictates which users get water in times of
shortage. 53 These two functions of PA sometimes conflict,
especially in basins with no completed adjudication, where
priority administration is unavailable until there is a legal
determination of the various users' priorities. 54
48. See GETCHES, supra note 6, at 111.
49. See State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 292 N.W. 239 (Neb. 1940).
50. See 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 16.02.
51. See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of
Adjudicating Rivers and Streams (pt. 2), 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 337-56
(2006) (describing status of water right adjudications in the various western
states).
52. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. D'Antonio, 249
P.3d 932, 938 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010); Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232,
240 (Wash. 1993); see also Hobbs, supra note 14, at 44 (noting that "adjudication
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As refined by the early state water codes, the structure of
PA has stood since the 1800s as the officially accepted
framework for water allocation and use in the West.5 5 There
have certainly been some modifications, and the doctrine has
evolved somewhat over the past century. 56 But given all that
has changed in the West during that span, the longevity of the
foundational principles of beneficial use and priority is rather
remarkable, and the next Part addresses how these principles
have managed to endure this long despite the pressures they
have faced.
II. PRIOR APPROPRIATION UNDER PRESSURE
Scholars have been saying for many years that various
forces are applying pressure for change in western water law,
pushing the states away from traditional PA. 5 7 Some of these
forces are external to the states, resulting largely from the
requirements of federal law, while others arise from within the
states themselves. In general, however, these forces seek to
ensure adequate water supplies for certain uses that lack
established senior water rights, contrary to traditional PA and
its unquestioning protection for the oldest recognized uses.
Among the various forces for change, federal laws may
have received the most attention. Since the Supreme Court
decided Winters v. United States,58 federal reserved water
rights have caused significant consternation in the West.5 9
These concerns grew more acute in 1963, when the- Supreme
and administration of rights through governmental action is essential to a
functioning prior appropriation system").
55. Tarlock, supra note 16, at 769-75.
56. Id. at 770 ("The distinguishing feature of prior appropriation is its
continual evolution in response to a changing West."); Johnson & DuMars, supra
note 2, at 356-87 (describing various changes to western water law over time).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9. See generally Charles T. DuMars
& A. Dan Tarlock, Symposium Introduction, New Challenges to State Water
Allocation Sovereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 331 (1989).
58. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (recognizing a
water right for an Indian Reservation in Montana based on a treaty that was
silent regarding water, and establishing a basis in federal law to claim water
rights for other Indian lands).
59. See Frank J. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54
DENV. L.J. 473, 476-78 (1977) (describing reaction of western water lawyers and
politicians to a 1955 Supreme Court decision that signaled an expansion of the
reserved rights doctrine, and noting that in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963), "[t]he chimera became a dragon: [r]eserved rights for non-Indian federal
lands were declared to exist in real life").
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Court first recognized reserved rights for federal lands such as
national parks and wildlife refuges in Arizona v. California.60
The Court had held in Winters that an Indian Reservation had
a water right under federal law, but extending the Winters
doctrine to other non-tribal federal lands posed a threat to the
states and their water users: Reserved rights arise from federal
rather than state law, based on the purposes of the federal land
designation rather than actual beneficial use, with a priority
tied to the date of the federal designation. 6 1 The 1970s saw
Congress enact significant national environmental legislation,
including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments
of 1972 and 1977 (creating the Clean Water Act in its modern
form) 62 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). 63 These
statutes raised the possibility of federal restrictions on water
development and use that would otherwise be authorized under
state law. 64
For the most part, however, these federal laws have forced
few major changes to existing water allocation laws and water
uses. Federal reserved water right litigation has proceeded
almost entirely in state courts since the 1970s, when the
western states won a series of jurisdictional battles in the
Supreme Court. 65 The great water law scholar Frank Trelease
wrote in 1977 that he was still waiting to see a case where a
water user suffered real and substantial harm from the
operation of the Winters doctrine, and he declared that he was
"tired of leaping into action at every call of 'Wolf 1 "66 Today,
reserved water right claims are typically settled out of court,

60. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601 (holding that the rationale
underlying reserved water rights for Indian reservations also supports reserved
rights for other lands designated by the United States for particular purposes).
61. Trelease, supra note 59, at 474.
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2006).
64. DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 57, at 342-43.
65. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983); Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818-21 (1976);
United States v. Dist. Court, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
66. Trelease, supra note 59, at 492. Trelease wrote that "at one time . . .
federal reserved water right[s]" were compared to the "great white shark" of the
book and the movie "Jaws," but he was beginning to wonder if they were actually
"insignificant and worthless," much like the "measly pupfish" at the center of the
Supreme Court decision in Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Trelease, supranote 59, at 474-75.
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consistent with a longstanding policy of the Western Governors
Association (WGA). 67
As for the Clean Water Act, its implementation (with rare
exceptions) has focused exclusively on water quality rather
than quantity,68 despite a Supreme Court case calling that
distinction "artificial" and upholding state authority to use
water quality standards to protect minimum flows. 69 The ESA,
by contrast, has created significant pressure in some locations
to reallocate water from existing users to provide habitat for
imperiled species 70-which may explain why the WGA has
made ESA reform a priority issue, in hopes of increasing
certainty for water users and ensuring state control over water
allocation. 7 '
These federal pressures, however, have prompted the
western states to take only modest steps in reforming their
own water laws; David Getches wrote that the states' small
advances in water policy during the 1990s were driven almost
solely by federal regulatory pressure and local innovations and
that while "the reasons for reform persist and are better

67. See Reed D. Benson, A Bright Idea from the Black Canyon: Federal
JudicialReview of Reserved Water Right Settlements, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
229, 236-38 (2010).

68. For example, in recent years the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
has interpreted the Act's section 402 permitting requirements quite narrowly,
choosing to leave certain pollution sources unregulated so as to avoid any
potential conflicts with water supply activities. See Friends of the Everglades v. S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding EPA rule
exempting certain water transfer activities from permitting requirements). The
EPA's position on this issue is criticized elsewhere in this Volume. See generally
Chris Reagen, Comment, The Water Transfers Rule: How an EPA Rule Threatens
to Undermine the Clean Water Act, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 307 (2011). Similarly, the
states and EPA have not used their full authority under section 303 to address
water pollution problems associated with "flow impairment," such as that caused
by dam operations and water diversions. See Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without
Solution: Flow Impairment Problems Under Clean Water Act Section 303, 24
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 228-56 (2005) (describing reserved water right
settlements, and citing the WGA policy in favor of tribal reserved water right
settlements).
69. PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719-20 (1994).
70. See Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common:
Considering the Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered
Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 30-32 (2004) (summarizing notable
conflicts between water use and the ESA).
71. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs.
State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241,
315 & n.517.
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understood than ever, existing state legal and institutional
frameworks endure virtually unchanged." 72
Other forces for change in water laws and practices come
from within the individual western states, reflecting each
state's shifting demographics, economic bases, and popular
values. As several western states experienced rapid population
growth and associated economic change, they experienced
pressure to ensure that water is available to serve new
residents and new enterprises-including businesses such as
whitewater rafting companies that rely on more-or-less natural
outdoor amenities. In addition, support has grown within the
West for laws allowing water to be left in its natural course, so
that rivers and lakes can provide environmental, economic, and
recreational benefits to a predominantly dry region. 73
This latter push for reform has led most of the western
states to enact statutes making some provision for preserving
"instream flows," primarily by allowing state agencies to
appropriate water in its natural course for environmental or
recreational purposes, without the need for diversion. 74 The
statutes were otherwise consistent with basic PA principles,
however, in that they typically authorized instream flow rights
for a specific beneficial use (typically fish habitat) and with a
specific priority date. 75 They offered some legal protection for
flowing rivers and the amenities they provide, and although
protection has often been quite limited in practice, the
instream flow laws did represent a significant policy reform for
the western water codes.
Recognizing this fact, agricultural water users challenged
some of the laws as being fundamentally inconsistent with PA,
but courts rejected these challenges and upheld legislative
authority to allow this new form of water right. 76 Despite PA
language in their respective state constitutions, these courts
held that diversion of water was not absolutely necessary for a
valid appropriation, effectively allowing statutes to waive a
72. Getches, supra note 7, at 71.
73. See Tarlock, supra note 16, at 771-74.
74. See Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programsin the
Western United States, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 177, 179 (1998).
75. DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION:
SEEKING A BALANCE INWESTERN WATER USE 143-45 (1997).
76. See generally Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n v. 25 Corp., 463 N.W.2d 591
(Neb. 1990). The court relied on similar holdings from Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water ConservationBd., 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979) and
Idaho Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924 (Idaho 1974).
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once-fundamental PA requirement. 77 Perhaps because they
show that western water law can respond to changing needs
and values, the instream flow statutes have been touted as a
major advance.78
Even where state water law remains officially true to PA
principles, however, some scholars have argued that the
western states do not always apply those principles-even the
most fundamental ones. For example, Dan Tarlock wrote in
2000 that the priority principle was "more bluff than
substance," because "experience will demonstrate that
priorities are seldom enforced in practice. In many situations,
the strict enforcement of prior appropriation would raise
substantial fairness and efficiency concerns," and therefore "it
is not surprising that states have taken extraordinary steps to
ensure that the rule is never applied in practice."79
Janet Neuman found a similar reluctance by states to
enforce PA's rules banning wasteful uses and terminating
water rights after years of nonuse-both key corollaries of the
bedrock principle of beneficial use. Her 1998 article found that
even though PA's "requirement of 'beneficial use without waste'
sounds tight, as if water users must carefully husband the
resource, using every drop of water completely and efficiently,"
the reality is that it has been applied loosely, showing great
tolerance for inefficient old practices.80 "The prohibitions
against waste-even the threat of forfeiture for nonuse-are
mostly hortatory concepts that rarely result in cutbacks in
water use."81
One of my early articles suggested that the Pacific
Northwest states followed a practice of protecting the water
use status quo, rather than implementing PA principles:
77. Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n, 463 N.W.2d at 601 ("Although a number of
courts and authorities have stated that a diversion is a prerequisite [to a valid
appropriation], this view has been criticized as being obsolete" in light of the
permitting requirement for new water uses.).
78. Gregory Hobbs has called instream flow laws "the most dramatic
innovation" in state water law. Hobbs, supra note 14, at 47. "Instream flows were
traditionally considered to be a waste of water; today they are fundamental to the
implementation of public values." Id. at 55.
79. Tarlock, supra note 15, at 883. New Mexico's efforts to gain compliance
with the Pecos River compact and decree represent an extreme example of a state
trying to avoid administering water rights by priority. See generally Joshua
Mann, Saving Water in the Pecos: One Coin, Two Sides, Many Overdrafts (And No
Bail Outs?), 47 IDAHO L. REv. 341 (2011).
80. Neuman, supra note 28, at 922.
81. Id.
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In order to perpetuate current uses, state legislatures,
courts, and agencies alike have refused to apply, and
sometimes have even changed, legal requirements . . .. [B]y

consistently choosing to protect established water uses
rather than applying the familiar rules of prior
appropriation, the Northwest states have significantly
undermined those rules. 82
In spite of the pressures for change, the reforms adopted
by western states, and the failure to implement basic rules, PA
remains widely accepted as the basis for water allocation and
management in the western states. Although Tarlock identified
a growing gap between the form of PA and actual water
allocations,8 3 he rightly acknowledged that PA "remains the
primary water law of the western states and is likely to remain
so for the foreseeable future." 84 The core principles of
"beneficial use is the basis, measure, and limit of a water
right"8 5 and "first in time is first in right" are still recognized as
the legal basis for water rights and management in the West,
even when they are honored in the breach. 86 Thus, PA officially
lives on-but even this formal commitment to its basic
principles is now fading, as discussed in the next Part.
III. HOW THE WESTERN STATES HAVE UNDERMINED PRIOR
APPROPRIATION

In Wilkinson's colorful memorial to PA, the death of Prior
at age 152 was mostly the work of outside agitators: politicians
in Washington D.C., academics, environmentalists, and others
pushing for changes in the law and management of western
water. 87 Surely the western states, having adopted Prior
Appropriation, would stay true to a doctrine they had spent
years defending against federal threats. It is rather ironic that
when crusty old Prior was finally deposed, it proved to be a
82. Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established
Water Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation, 28
ENVTL. L. 881, 916, 918 (1998).
83. Tarlock, supra note 16, at 775.
84. Id. at 776.
85. 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(c)(4)(A).
86. Focusing on the "first in time, first in right" principle, Tarlock stated that
PA "remains deeply entrenched in the states and in the courts," Tarlock, supra
note 16, at 773, but also predicted that "the gap between the form of the doctrine
and the actual allocation of water will continue to grow," driven by the evolving
needs and values of a changing West. Id. at 775.
87. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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palace coup, done by the states themselves. This Part analyzes
three relatively recent cases from three states in order to
explain how the western states have departed from even the
most fundamental PA principles.
A.

Three Recent Cases Addressing Core Prior
AppropriationPrinciples

The cases discussed in this Section are not the only ones in
which state courts have deviated from the traditional PA
doctrine.88 These three decisions were chosen as the focus of
this Article because they share certain notable characteristics.
First, they all involve a conflict between PA principles and a
state statute or rule. Second, they are all recent, having been
decided within the last five years. Third, they all involve one of
the core principles of PA-either "first in time, first in right" or
beneficial use as the basis of a water right.
1.

In Idaho, Making Prior Appropriation More
"Reasonable" as Between Users

Idaho's departure from key PA principles, in the context of
a dispute between senior surface water users and junior
groundwater users, is in some ways the most remarkable of the
three examples discussed here. Unlike the other two cases, the
Idaho litigation involved rules promulgated by the state water
agency, not an act of the state legislature. Moreover, not only is
PA written into the Idaho Constitution, 89 but the Idaho
Supreme Court had strongly reinforced the "first in time, first

88. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of Existing Rights to Use Water, 55 P.3d 396,
406-07 (Mont. 2002) (holding that no diversion was needed to appropriate water
for fish, wildlife, or recreational purposes under pre-1973 Montana law).
89. The most relevant language states:
The right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied, except that the
state may regulate and limit the use thereof for power purposes. Priority
of appropriations shall give the better right as between those using the
water; but when the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for
the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the
water for domestic purposes shall (subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed by law) have the preference over those claiming for any other
purpose; and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have
preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3.
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in right" principle in a 1993 decision that spurred adoption of
the rules. 90
The 1993 dispute arose because the Idaho Department of
Water Resources (IDWR) was then administering surface
water and groundwater as separate resources-what might be
called "disjunctive management." 91 Thus, the agency had no
practice of curtailing groundwater pumping to benefit surface
water users, regardless of their relative priority dates. When
the Curran Tunnel ran short of water in 1993, users with
senior (surface) rights to its water asked IDWR to reduce
groundwater pumping from the hydrologically connected Snake
Plain Aquifer. The agency refused, stating that it had made no
"formal hydrologic determination that such conjunctive
management is appropriate." 92 The surface users sued, asking
the Idaho courts to order IDWR to fulfill its duty to administer
water according to established priorities.
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that IDWR had a
clear legal duty to administer water by priority, and ordered
the director to comply. The court acknowledged that the agency
had some discretion as to the details, but still had a mandatory
duty to distribute water in accordance with PA. 93 IDWR
nonetheless insisted that "a decision has to be made in the
public interest as to whether those who are impacted by
groundwater development are unreasonably blocking full use of
the resource" 94-in other words, whether the call should be
denied in order to enable continued pumping by the juniors.
The court not only rejected that argument, but even required
the state to pay the plaintiffs' attorney fees because the
agency's position had "no reasonable basis in law or fact."95
IDWR then promulgated rules governing calls to reduce
junior groundwater pumping. 96 These Rules for Conjunctive
90. Musser v. Higginson, 871 P.2d 809 (Idaho 1994), abrogated on other
grounds by Rincover v. State, 976 P.2d 473 (Idaho 1999).
91. "Conjunctive management," by contrast, treats surface water and
hydrologically connected groundwater as a single resource for management
purposes. The Idaho rules define conjunctive management to mean "[1]egal and
hydrologic integration of administration of the diversion and use of water under
water rights from surface and ground water sources, including areas having a
common ground water supply." IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 37.03.11.010.03 (2011).

92. See Musser, 871 P.2d at 811.
93. Id. at 812.
94. Id. at 813 (quoting IDWR).
95. Id. at 814.
96. IDWR had no specific statutory authority for the conjunctive management
rules, but had general rulemaking authority under section 42-603 of the Idaho
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Management of Surface and Ground Water Resources 97
"acknowledge" all elements of PA under Idaho law, 98 but then
immediately state a "traditional policy of reasonable use"
governing water administration and use. 99 The rules declare
that the reasonable use policy "includes the concepts of priority
in time and superiority in right being subject to conditions of
reasonable use as the legislature may by law prescribe," as well
as principles of "optimum development of water resources in
the public interest" and "full economic development."100 The
rules specify procedures for responding to a delivery call,' 0 '
consisting primarily of a potentially drawn-out "contested case"
administrative hearing to determine the factual and legal
issues involved in the dispute.102 The rules also identify
numerous factors IDWR could consider in determining whether
relief was justified (including potential changes in the senior's
water use facilities or practices), 0 3 and give the agency several
options for addressing the issue. 104
Surface water users sued, arguing that the rules were
contrary to PA in various ways and therefore were facially
unconstitutional.1 0 5 Most of their arguments failed in the
district court, but they did prevail on some issues, 106 and the
district court held that the entire package of rules violated the
state constitution. IDWR and groundwater users appealed to
the Idaho Supreme Court, which held unanimously in
American Falls Reservoir District No. 2 v. Idaho Department of
Water Resources 0 7 that the conjunctive management rules
were not facially unconstitutional.
Code (authorizing IDWR to "to adopt rules and regulations for the distribution of
water from the streams, rivers, lakes, ground water and other natural water
sources as shall be necessary to carry out the laws in accordance with the
priorities of the rights of the users thereof'). See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 421805(8) (2011).
97. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 37.03.11 (2011).
98. Id. r. 37.03.11.020.02.
99. Id. r. 37.03.11.020.03.
100. Id.
101. Id. rr. 37.03.11.030-.031, .040-.041
102. Id. r. 37.03.11.030.02.
103. Id. r. 37.03.11.042.
104. Id. r. 37.03.11.030.07. Options listed in the rule include granting or
denying the petition in whole or in part, designating the area as a type of district
for management purposes, or prohibiting or limiting pumping from certain wells
by summary order. Id.
105. Am. Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 154 P.3d 433,
439 (Idaho 2007).
106. See id. (summarizing district court's ruling on summary judgment).
107. Id.
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After complimenting the district court's opinion as
scholarly, detailed, and "exemplary,"10 8 the Idaho Supreme
Court disagreed with its conclusion that the rule was
unconstitutional in certain respects. 109 The district court had
held that the rules' procedures for responding to a delivery call
violated PA because the rules were silent on three issues:
whether a presumption of injury exists in favor of senior users
when juniors divert water during shortages, whether juniors
bear the burden of proving that such diversions do not cause
injury, and whether IDWR must timely respond to calls.I10 The
Idaho Supreme Court held that the rules' silence regarding
presumption of injury and burden of proof did not make the
rules invalid, especially because they specifically recognized PA
as established in Idaho law. 1 The American Falls court also
denied that the rules must set a deadline for responding to
calls. "Clearly, a timely response is required when a delivery
call is made and water is necessary to respond to that call," but
nothing in the rules would prohibit that, and neither the state
constitution nor the statutes provide a specific timeframe for a
response. 112 The court stated that delivery calls raise complex
factual issues, and that it is "vastly more important that the
Director have the necessary pertinent information and the time
to make a reasoned decision."113
The district court also held the rules unconstitutional
because they exempted all domestic and stockwater rights from
delivery calls, effectively giving them priority over senior
rights.11 4 The Idaho Supreme Court, however, pointed to
language in the Idaho Constitution that allows junior domestic
uses to continue in times of shortage, but seems to require that
they compensate senior users for lost water. 115 It then noted
that both the constitution and the rules give priority to
domestic uses, and although the rules make no provision for

108. Id. at 440.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 443-44.
Ill. Id. at 444-45.
112. Id. at 445.
113. Id. at 446. The court's statement is ambiguous: adequate time and
information for the Director to make a correct decision is "vastly more important"
than what? The court might mean that these factors are more important than a
timely response, or that they are more important than specifying a timeframe for
response in the text of the rules.
114. Id. at 451.
115. Id. at 451-52; see also IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3.
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compensation to senior users, neither do they preclude it.116
Again, the court gave the rules the benefit of the doubt in the
context of a facial challenge to their constitutionality." 7
Equally interesting is the list of issues that were decided
against the plaintiffs in the lower court but not appealed. The
Idaho Supreme Court made a point of saying that the district
court had upheld the rules' provision allowing IDWR, in
response to a delivery call, to consider "material injury;
reasonableness of the senior water right diversion; whether a
senior right can be satisfied using alternate points andior
means of diversion; full economic development; compelling a
surface user to convert his point of diversion to a ground water
source; and reasonableness of use." 118 The Idaho Supreme
Court also noted that there was no appeal of the district court's
rejection of the argument "that water rights in Idaho should be
administered strictly on a priority in time basis."ll 9
American Falls illustrates the difficulties of prevailing in a
facial challenge, where the plaintiff must show that the law is
unconstitutional in all possible applications.120 But it also
indicates that the court views "reasonableness" of water uses
as a water law principle no less important than "first in time,
first in right."
2.

In Washington, Recognizing Water Rights
Regardless of Beneficial Use

Washington's deviation from PA differs from Idaho's in
that it involves a statute rather than a rule. Moreover, the
Washington Constitution does not require allocation of water
under PA,121 so the statute did not face the same type of
116. American Falls, 154 P.3d at 452.
117. Id. The court did the same on another key issue: the provision of the rules
which seemed to allow IDWR to limit the holders of storage water rights to a
"reasonable" amount of carryover water-that is, water held in storage at the end
of season, to be "saved" for the future. Id. at 449-51. The court noted that storage
water rights should be protected in their priorities, but that stored water must
also be applied to beneficial use, and that the director had discretion to balance
those two PA requirements in a particular case. Id.
118. Id. at 440-41.
I19. Id. at 441.
120. Id. at 442. The Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly indicated that its
decision left room for later challenges to the rule as applied, based on a developed
factual record. Id. at 446-47, 449, 451-52.
121. The Washington Constitution has only one sentence regarding water
rights: "The use of the waters of this state for irrigation, mining and
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constitutional challenge as the Idaho rules did. The
Washington statute is remarkable, however, in that it alters
the beneficial use requirement-the most fundamental of all
PA principles.
Washington's move away from PA, like Idaho's, arose from
a judicial decision that affirmed a key principle of the doctrine.
In a 1998 opinion, the Washington Supreme Court reviewed
conditions imposed by the Department of Ecology ("Ecology")
on an extension of a water use permit held by a developer.122
Ecology had originally issued the permit in 1973 for a
development planned for 253 lots, but water lines had been
extended to only ninety-three lots by the early 1990s. The
developer, nonetheless, argued that he had a vested right to
the full amount of his permitted water right under a policy,
followed by Ecology for at least forty years, that provided final
water rights for certain kinds of users based on completion of a
water delivery system. This "pumps and pipes" policy
quantified such vested (certificated) rights based on the
capacity of the system rather than on actual beneficial use.
Ecology came to doubt the legality of "pumps and pipes" and
refused to apply that policy to the developer's permit renewal,
imposing a new condition that the final certificate would be
quantified based on actual beneficial use. 123 In State v.
Theodoratus, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
challenged condition, based on statutes and case law requiring
"that a water right must be based on actual application of
water to beneficial use and not upon system capacity. . . .
Perfection of an appropriative right requires that appropriation
is complete only when the water is actually applied to a
beneficial use."1 24
Five years later, the Washington Legislature partially
undid Theodoratusby adopting a statute upholding the validity
of existing certificates issued under the "pumps and pipes"
policy.1 25 The statute defined "municipal water supply
purposes" to include supplying water for residential purposes
manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use." WASH. CONST. art. XXI, §
1.
122. See generally State v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241 (Wash. 1998). A water
use permit typically requires the holder to construct facilities and apply water to
beneficial use within a specified time (e.g., five years), but that deadline may be
extended for cause. 2 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 15.03(d)(1).
123. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d at 1243-44.
124. Id. at 1246.
125. H.R. 1338, 58th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
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to at least fifteen residences, thus extending coverage to many
small, non-municipal water systems. 126 It then provided that a
water right was "in good standing" if it was "represented by a
water right certificate issued prior to September 9, 2003, for
municipal water supply purposes . . . where the certificate was

issued based on an administrative policy" to administer such
certificates after construction of the municipal water supply
system, "rather than after the water had been placed to actual
beneficial use."127 Certificates issued after that date, however,
were to be based only on "actual beneficial use of water."1 28 The
Washington Supreme Court noted that Theodoratus had raised
questions about whether existing certificates based on "pumps
and pipes" were valid, and it characterized the 2003 statute as
having "essentially put the legislature's imprimatur on our
holding in Theodoratus prospectively while confirming the good
standing of water certificates issued under the former
system."1 2 9
Two groups of plaintiffs sued, alleging that the municipal
water supply statute was facially unconstitutional-but
because Washington's constitution does not establish PA as the

basis for water allocation in the state, they could not prevail by
showing that the law was contrary to the bedrock principle of
beneficial use. They instead argued that the statute violated
separation-of-powers principles (partly based on what they saw
as its retroactive effect in overturning Theodoratus) and denied
them substantive and procedural due process. The trial court
agreed with their separation-of-powers arguments and ruled
the statute unconstitutional. 130

The Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
statute in Lummi Indian Nation v. State. 131 In rejecting the
lower court's holding regarding separation of powers, the
Washington Supreme Court recognized that the legislature has
clear authority to make policy, enact new statutes, and amend
existing statutes. 132 The legislature exercised its power
appropriately here, said the court, because the municipal water
statute simply amended "an area of the law subject to ongoing
126. See Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 241 P.3d 1220, 1226 (Wash. 2010)
(explaining provisions of the 2003 statute).
127. Id. at 1227 n.7.
128. Id. at 1225-26 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
129. Id.
130. See id. (summarizing the trial court's holding).
131. Id. at 1234.
132. Id. at 1229.
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legislative refinement in the face of changing conditions." 33
And by confirming existing certificates that had been issued
under the old "pumps and pipes" approach, 134 the legislature
was not adjudicating the facts of any one water right, but
rather, was making policy. 135
The plaintiffs also argued that the statute denied them due
process by defining the term "municipal water supply
purposes" to include water suppliers serving as few as fifteen
taps, thus giving many water suppliers significant advantages
under state water law; for example, municipal water rights are
not lost through nonuse, and the place of use is more flexible
than it is for other kinds of rights.136 Thus, the statute gave a
new set of users the benefit of municipal status, but in doing so
it imposed a burden on competing users. The court recognized
that these changes could harm some junior users, whose
"enjoyment of their water rights may be impaired without
individualized notice or prior opportunity to comment."1 37 But
the court insisted that a facial due process challenge requires
more than "mere potential impairment of some hypothetical
person's enjoyment of a right," and that the statute did not
change plaintiffs' status as "junior water rights holders who
take water subject to the rights of senior rights holders whose
status may be improved by these changes." 38 And since those
changes did no more than confirm existing certificates and
define a previously undefined term (municipal water supply),
they did not violate due process. 139
Interestingly, the Lummi court began its opinion by
stressing the importance of beneficial use in Washington water
law. "The beneficial and wise use of water has been a public
concern since before we achieved statehood." 40 The court also
133. Id.
134. The court noted that Theodoratus had not involved a perfected
(certificated) right-only a request to extend a permit-and therefore did not
reduce or terminate any rights that had vested under the "pumps and pipes"
policy. Id. at 1232. "While Theodoratus may have changed the expectations of
those who acquired water rights after the date it was issued, it did not
automatically divest or invalidate any vested or perfected rights." Id. Thus, the
court read the statute only as confirming existing water rights, not as
resurrecting them.
135. Id. at 1230.
136. See id. at 1230-31.
137. Id. at 1231.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1232.
140. Id. at 1223.
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noted that a water use permit represents an inchoate right that
does not vest until the right is perfected, and that the state
agency's "pumps and pipes" policy had created some confusion
about the requirements to perfect a permitted right, even
though early Washington cases had held that "rights were not
perfected until the water was both appropriated and put to
beneficial use." 141 After providing that background, however,
the court analyzed the validity of the statute without
discussing whether it was faithful to the beneficial use
principle of PA.
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional attack on the municipal water supply statute,
while explicitly leaving the door open for later challenges to the
law as applied to specific facts. 142 Because PA does not appear
in the state constitution, and the Lummi opinion therefore did
not assess the statute's faithfulness to PA in a constitutional
challenge, one might presume that the case has little bearing
on the ongoing role of PA in western water law. But it is
significant that the court, after faithfully supporting PA in
Theodoratus, unanimously upheld a statute recognizing
perfected water rights based on system capacity-directly
contrary to the bedrock principle of beneficial use as the basis,
measure, and limit of a water right.
3.

In New Mexico, Allowing New Uses Despite
Likely Harm to Existing Ones

As in the Lummi case, the recent dispute over water law in
New Mexico involves a facial challenge to a legislative
enactment that arguably contradicts a basic PA principle. In
New Mexico, however, the prior appropriation doctrine is
written into the state constitution, which states that
"unappropriated water . . . [is] subject to appropriation for

beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state," and
that "[p]riority of appropriation shall give the better right."l 43
Thus, Bounds v. Statel 44-on appeal to the state supreme court
141. Id. at 1225 (citing Ortel v. Stone, 205 P.2d 1055 (Wash. 1922)).
142. Id. at 1229, 1234; see also id. at 1227 n.4 (noting at least one "as applied"
challenge was pending at the administrative level).
143. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
144. 2011-NMCA-011, 149 N.M. 484, 252 P.3d 708 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), cert.
granted sub nom. Bounds v. Dantonio, 2011-NMCERT-001, 263 P.3d 902 (2011),
and cert. granted sub nom. N.M. Livestock v. State Eng'r, 2011-NMCERT-001,
263 P.3d 902 (2011).
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as of this writing-raises the issue of whether a statute is
unconstitutional because it conflicts with PA.
The statute at issue in Bounds requires the New Mexico
State Engineer to issue permits to use groundwater for
"household or other domestic use" without regard to the
availability of unappropriated water or the impact of the new
use on existing water rights. 145 The statute simply states that
the State Engineer "shall issue" such permits, and exempts
them from the usual standards because of "the varying
amounts and time such water is used and the relatively small
amounts of water consumed" by domestic wells.146 This
domestic well statute is relatively old, having remained on the
books (with minor revisions) since 1953.147
Domestic wells might have been a minor matter in the
New Mexico of the 1950s, but in recent years they have become
a serious concern. The Office of the State Engineer (OSE)
estimated that there were 137,000 domestic wells statewide in
2000, and that number continues to increase, with the OSE
processing nearly 5,000 new domestic well permits in 2007.148
The cumulative impact of these domestic wells on surface flows
is a growing concern, given that most existing wells are within
five miles of a stream, and the OSE has estimated that total
annual withdrawals by domestic wells in the Rio Grande basin
alone exceed 24,000 acre-feet. 149 Thus, by the early twenty-first
century the stage was set for a challenge to the domestic well
statute.
The New Mexico litigation began when Bounds, an
irrigator with senior surface water rights in the Rio Mimbres
stream system, sued to enjoin the OSE from issuing any
further domestic well permits in the fully appropriated
145. N.M. STAT. § 72-12-1.1 (2011).
146. N.M. STAT. §§ 72-12-1 to -1.1 (2011). The New Mexico water code has
nearly identical permitting provisions for livestock watering, id. § 72-12-1.2, and
for certain small-scale temporary uses, id. § 72-12-1.3, but Bounds dealt only with
the domestic well statute.
147. Paul Bossert, Domestic Wells, in UTTON TRANSBOUNDARY RES. CTR.,
11-6
(2012),
11-5,
WATER
MATTERS!
LAW
SCH.,
UNIV.
N.M.
http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Water-Matters-2012/2012-water-mattersfinal
full-publication.pdf.
148. Id. at 11-8.
149. Id. This figure represents nearly one-fourth of the water used by New
Mexico's largest metropolitan area. The Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water
Utility Authority uses about 104,000 acre-feet per year to serve nearly 600,000
customers. ALBUQUERQUE BERNALILLO CNTY., WATER UTIL. AUTH., ANNUAL
INFORMATION STATEMENT 6-7 (2011), http://www.abcwua.org/pdfs/2011AIS.pdf.
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Mimbres basin. Bounds argued that the domestic well statute
violated the state constitution by requiring issuance of permits
without regard to water availability or injury to existing rights,
resulting in new groundwater withdrawals that would reduce
surface water flows to the detriment of senior users. After
initially involving claims alleging harm specifically to Bounds,
the case eventually came down to a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the domestic well statute. 150
The district court granted summary judgment in Bounds'
favor, holding that the statute gave senior water users no way
to oppose new domestic well permits and allowed no
determination of whether the new use would impair existing
rights.15' "It is not logical, let alone consistent with
constitutional protections, to require the [State Engineer] to
issue domestic well permits without any consideration of the
availability of unappropriated water or the priority of
appropriated water."1 52 The court also noted that the State
Engineer had "testified he would not subject domestic wells to
a priority call notwithstanding this [was] a derogation of his
[constitutional] duty."153 The district court held the statute
unconstitutional, and ordered the OSE to handle all domestic
well applications on the same basis as other permit
applications. 154
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, upholding the
statute in a unanimous opinion by a three-judge panel.155 The
court reviewed relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules, 156 then discussed cases addressing the protection
150. See Bounds v. State, 2011-NMCA-011, 149 N.M. 484, 252 P.3d 708 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bounds v. Dantonio, 2011-NMCERT-001,
263 P.3d 902 (2011), and cert. granted sub nom. N.M. Livestock v. State Eng'r,
2011-NMCERT-001, 263 P.3d 902 (2011).
151. Id. at 711.
152. Id. at 710 (alteration in the original) (quoting the trial court's findings).
153. Id. at 711 (alterations in the original) (quoting the trial court).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 719-22.
156. The court noted that the State Engineer had adopted rules in 2006
purporting to allow for priority administration of domestic wells, at least those
issued after the date of those rules. See id. at 714. The court also quoted
extensively from a State Engineer's order relating to the Mimbres basin (from
whence the Bounds case arose), which provided that if water rights in the basin
were to be administered by priority, all out-of-priority domestic rights "shall be
curtailed and limited to essential indoor domestic uses and all outdoor uses shall
cease." Id. The order similarly provided for curtailment of "out-of-priority"
stockwatering uses "in order to limit such diversions to the relatively small
amounts of water required for essential livestock watering." Id. at 713-14.
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afforded to senior water rights under New Mexico law.1 57 The
court quoted from cases involving the statutes for issuing nondomestic water use permits; in one recent decision, the New
Mexico Supreme Court had held that under the surface water
permitting statute, water availability is the dispositive
threshold issue and that the OSE must summarily reject an
application if water is not available. 58 In a much earlier
case, 159 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that existing
statutes allowed the State Engineer to deny groundwater
permits that would lead to reduced flows in the fully
appropriated Rio Grande, saying that it would be "anomalous
for the [L]egislature to enact laws designed to permit water,
which would otherwise reach the stream in substantial
quantities, to be withdrawn by pumps and thereby attempt to
deprive the prior appropriators of their vested rights." 60 The
court of appeals said that these cases show that the OSE
generally cannot and does not issue new permits where no
water is available but do not establish that PA "forbids the
Legislature from enacting a law making an exception" to that
principle for new domestic wells.161
The court of appeals decision in Bounds turns on two
fundamental points. First, and most fundamentally, "[t]he
Constitution's priority doctrine establishes a broad priority
principle, nothing more. The prior appropriation provision is
not self-executing." 62 Second, "[t]he Legislature establishes the
administrative process required for adherence to the broad
constitutional principle. Thus, the Legislature has the
authority to enact laws setting out the process and to enact
exceptions to or deviate from those laws."l 63 In other words, the
constitution leaves the legislature free to create exceptions
157. Id. at 715-17.
158. The court of appeals quoted from the supreme court's opinion in Lion's
Gate Water v. D'Antonio, 2009-NMSC-057, 25, 226 P.3d 622, 632 (N.M. 2009):
"Whether water is available for appropriation is the threshold issue that
is dispositive of a permit application when water is not available for
appropriation. The Legislature ... mandated in Section 72-5-7 that the
State Engineer 'shall' summarily reject water rights applications upon a
determination that water is unavailable for appropriation."
Bounds, 252 P.3d at 716.
159. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 79 (N.M. 1962).
160. Bounds, 252 P.3d at 717 (alteration in the original) (quoting Reynolds, 379
P.2d at 79).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 719.
163. Id. (emphasis added).
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from the normal rules of PA, including rules regarding denial
of new permits in fully appropriated basins. 164 The court
declared that the domestic well statute "is such an exception or
variation, ultimately leaving for the State Engineer, as difficult
as it looks to be, the administrative determination whether to
curtail domestic use when senior water rights are impaired or
threatened with impending impairment because of water
shortages." 65
This power to create "exceptions" to the priority principle
does not, however, free the legislature to ignore the rights of
senior water users.16 6 The court of appeals presumed that the
legislature understood the need to balance the demand for
domestic wells against the protection of senior rights,167 and
further presumed that the legislature
sees the hydrological expertise of the State Engineer as the
preferable, if not the only reasonable way to attempt to
reach the right balance of priorities and needs. It is up to
the Legislature and the State Engineer to create an
efficient, effective, and fair administrative process to reach
the required balance and to protect senior water rights. 168
The court then noted a New Mexico statute providing for
administrative appeals of "acts or decisions" of officials
subordinate to the State Engineer, followed by judicial
review, 169 thus providing a process for senior water users to
protect themselves against the effects of domestic wells. The
court of appeals concluded that even in fully appropriated
basins,
we do not see how the Legislature is forbidden under a
facial constitutional attack from nevertheless enacting an
exception to its existing statutory regime permitting
additional appropriation for domestic purposes as long as
senior water rights are not in fact impaired or subject to
impending impairment. 170

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See id. at 721.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id.
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Like the Idaho and Washington cases, Bounds reached a
result that not only undermined PA but also differed from a
recent decision from its state supreme court. Like the other two
courts, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected a failed facial
challenge to a law but left disappointed water users free to
attack it as applied to them. And, as in Idaho, the court
determined that the law did not violate the PA provisions of
the state constitution. But the Bounds decision (if it stands)
may have the greatest implications of the three because it
holds that one of the most fundamental elements of PA-"first
in time, first in right"-is only a broad principle subject to
legislatively created exceptions.
B. Assessing the Damage:Analysis of the Three Cases
American Falls, Lummi, and Bounds all uphold state laws
that contravene basic PA principles. In Idaho, the conjunctive
management rules diminish "first in time, first in right" by
emphasizing the need for "reasonableness" in all uses, and by
subjecting delivery calls to a potentially lengthy administrative
process that allows IDWR to weigh many factors in reaching a
decision. 171 In Washington, the statute legitimates water rights
based on "pumps and pipes" capacity rather than actual
beneficial use, not just for cities but also for entities supplying
water to as few as fifteen taps.172 In New Mexico, the domestic
well statute gives senior users no protection from harm that
could result from issuing new permits, requiring the OSE to
authorize new domestic wells without the usual process or
standards.173 Thus, each of these three cases weakens PA as
the fundamental doctrine of western water law by undermining
one of its most essential principles.1 74
171. See supra Part III.A.1.
172. See supra Part III.A.2.
173. See supra Part III.A.3.
174. I do not suggest that all of the recent western water cases undermine PA
principles; to the contrary, some decisions tend to support them. See, e.g., Kobobel
v. State, 249 P.3d 1127 (Colo. 2011) (rejecting groundwater users' claim that
curtailment of their groundwater pumping in favor of senior users effected a
taking of their property rights, because even though State Engineer had allowed
them to pump for years, PA always made their use subject to being curtailed for
the benefit of senior users); Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo.
2003) (holding that State Engineer's rules for temporary plans to replace stream
depletions caused by junior groundwater wells exceeded his statutory authority);
Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Mont. Dep't of Natural Res. & Conservation, 133 P.3d
224 (Mont. 2006) (rejecting agency's statutory interpretation which provided
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Some might argue that these three cases do not, in fact,
reflect any trend toward abandonment of PA by the western
states. Most obviously, none of the cases represents the last
word on the validity of the law at issue given the availability of
as-applied challenges, as well as the pending appeal in Bounds.
Given that a facial challenge to a law must fail unless there is
no potential application that would be constitutional,175 the
three reported decisions certainly do not provide an unqualified
endorsement of the disputed statutes and rules.
The Idaho Supreme Court very recently upheld IDWR's
application of the conjunctive management rules, 176 and
because the agency ordered curtailment of junior groundwater
uses for the benefit of senior surface water rights, that case
suggests that PA remains relevant in Idaho despite the rules.
The court's opinion in Clear Springs Foods v. Spackman seems
to support that view, as it repeatedly indicates that senior
users in Idaho are constitutionally protected against harm
caused by junior users177-although most or all of those
statements are apparently dicta. 178 Rhetoric aside, however,
the court in Clear Springs Foods did not simply apply "first in
time, first in right" as it had in Musser v. Higginson.
Most fundamentally, the court upheld the IDWR Director's
reliance on a groundwater model in determining the impacts of
minimal protection to senior water users from proposed new groundwater wells).
The latter two cases turned on statutory interpretation rather than application of
basic PA principles, but their results are consistent with the protection of senior
users from the impacts of junior groundwater pumping.
175. American Falls Reservoir v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 154 P.3d 433, 441
(Idaho 2007); Bounds v. State, 2011-NMCA-011, 149 N.M. 484, 252 P.3d 708
(N.M. Ct. App. 2010), cert. grantedsub nom. Bounds v. Dantonio, 2011-NMCERT001, 263 P.3d 902 (2011), and cert. granted sub nom. N.M. Livestock v. State
Eng'r, 2011-NMCERT-001, 263 P.3d 902 (2011); Lummi Indian Nation v. State,
241 P.3d 1220, 1227 (Wash. 2010).
176. Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 252 P.3d 71 (Idaho 2011).
177. Id. at 79, 81-82.
178. The court made most of its statements about PA in rejecting the
groundwater users' argument that a document called the Swan Falls Agreement
essentially protected all rights prior to October 1, 1984 from a senior call, and
thus precluded IDWR's order curtailing their pumping. Id. at 79. The court held
that the Swan Falls Agreement did no such thing, only subordinating certain
hydropower water rights held by Idaho Power. Id. at 79. Thus, the court's grand
statements about how the groundwater users' arguments would contradict PA in
Idaho are rather clearly dicta. Id. at 78-79, 81. Similarly, the court seemingly did
not need to invoke Idaho constitutional and statutory provisions regarding PA to
reject the groundwater users' argument that the IDWR order violated a statute
protecting "full economic development" of groundwater resources. Id. at 82-84.
The court correctly held that the statute simply did not apply in the context of a
call by senior surface users against junior groundwater users. Id. at 84.
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pumping and the amount of curtailment needed. Despite some
limitations of the model and uncertainty in its application, the
Director chose to rely on the model as the best available
science, and the court upheld that decision as being "within the
outer limits of his discretion" under the applicable law.179
Similarly, the court rejected the senior water users' argument
that the Director should have ordered a greater curtailment of
pumping than he did, holding that he did not abuse his
discretion by effectively applying the model's ten percent
margin of error in favor of the groundwater users.180 The
Director's decision not to curtail pumping within the margin of
error was partly based on the "public interest" provision in the
conjunctive management rules, although the Idaho Supreme
Court did not comment on that aspect of his decision. 18 Thus,
while Clear Springs Foods might seem like a vindication of PA,
it is primarily a victory for IDWR and its authority to exercise
its considerable discretion in applying the conjunctive
management rules. 182
Believers in the ongoing viability of PA may also offer a
couple of arguments based on established water law. They may
point to well-aged and well-recognized judicial decisions to
support the contention that PA has always included (or at least
accommodated) some of the principles involved in these three
cases. For example, in Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water
Co.,1 83 the U.S. Supreme Court held a century ago that it was
not "reasonable" for an Idaho irrigator to command essentially

the entire flow of the Snake River to run water wheels that
delivered water to his 430 acres. 184 And the so-called "growing

179. Clear Springs Foods, 252 P.3d at 95.
180. Id. at 97-98.
181. Id. The district court upheld the decision without regard to the "public
interest" factor, and the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and accepted
its rationale, so the higher court never considered whether the Director validly
based his decision partly on the public interest.
182. IDWR did lose on one issue, as the court held that the groundwater users
had been entitled to a hearing before the agency ordered curtailment of their
pumping. Id. at 95-97. The court stated that "the circumstances of a particular
delivery call or curtailment" will dictate whether a prior hearing is required. Id.
at 96. This holding is another aspect of Clear Springs Foods that may cut against
the court's PA rhetoric, because it may tend to delay pumping curtailment orders
to allow time for prior hearings, agency decisions, and appeals.
183. 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
184. Id. at 114-23; see also Jeffrey C. Fereday & Michael C. Creamer, The
Maximum Use Doctrine and Its Relevance to Water Rights Administration in
Idaho's Lower Boise River Basin, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 67, 71-74 (2010) (discussing
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cities doctrine"-allowing municipalities to hold rights to water
they had not yet beneficially used-dates at least to the 1930s,
when the Colorado Supreme Court held that it was "the
highest prudence on the part of [Denver] to obtain
appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs resulting
from a normal increase in population within a reasonable
period of time."1 85

While such old cases may contain relevant principles,
however, they hold much truer to PA basics than the new laws
do. Thus, it is one thing to hold that the water-wheel irrigator
in Schodde was unreasonable to demand the full flow of the
Snake to irrigate one farm; it is a very different thing to
suggest that "reasonableness" is a principle equal in
importance to priority 86 and a valid basis to deny a call by a
senior surface water appropriator using conventional irrigation
techniques.187 And it is one thing to hold, as the Colorado
Supreme Court did, that an incorporated municipality could

maintain inchoate water rights for future growth, conditioned
on the water eventually being applied to beneficial use;188 it is
another thing to allow any entity supplying more than a few
"maximum use" principles under Idaho water law, including the prohibition on
wasteful uses).
185. City & Cnty. of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939); see also
TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 43, at 97 (identifying Sheriff as a case applying the
growing cities doctrine).
186. In the PA context, the principle of reasonableness has applied most
strongly in the context of disputes between groundwater appropriators, where
courts and statutes have protected senior users from interference only to a
"reasonable" extent. See, e.g., Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 86566 (Utah 1969) (rejecting absolute protection for senior users in favor of a "rule of
reasonableness"). The Wayman court noted that several western states had
enacted statutes codifying such a rule. Id. at 866 & n.8 (citing statutes from
Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, and Wyoming).
Even in this context, however, priority has trumped reasonableness when
the two have directly conflicted. For example, in Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., the
Idaho Supreme Court noted that senior users were protected only in the
maintenance of "reasonable [well] pumping levels." 513 P.2d 627, 636 (Idaho
1973) (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-226). But it flatly rejected the arguments of
junior users that they were entitled to a pro rata share of the available supply of
an aquifer they shared with senior users. That sort of "correlative rights"
approach, the court said, was "repugnant to our constitutionally mandated prior
appropriation doctrine." Id. at 635. Because the aquifer was insufficient for all
users, only those with senior water rights got to continue pumping. Id. at 636-37.
187. The requirement that all water uses be "reasonable" is a core principle of
the riparian rights doctrine, which the western territories and states rejected long
ago. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
188. The Sheriff court noted, "[t]hat such water must first be applied to a
beneficial use by the city before it has any property right in it is not disputed."
Sheriff, 96 P.2d at 842.
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customers to retain perfected, permanent rights to water
regardlessof actual beneficial use.
The PA faithful might also contend that the results of
Lummi and Bounds, at least, are consistent with many western
water statutes. As the Washington Supreme Court noted,
"municipal water rights . . . often receive separate treatment in
water law."1 89 The Washington water code, for example,
exempts municipal water rights from being lost for nonuse.190
Several states have statutes that essentially codify the
"growing cities doctrine," allowing municipalities to hold water
rights in excess of their current needs in order to plan for
future growth,191 although none go as far as the Washington
law in disregarding beneficial use. As for the New Mexico
domestic well statute at issue in Bounds, it has counterparts in
several western states, including Oregon and Washington.192
While this statutory context does indicate that the three
recent cases are within the mainstream of western water law,
they also show that the mainstream has been shifting away
from PA. Municipal water rights and domestic wells are two
areas in which the states have long been willing to deviate
from PA in order to accommodate other important goals. By
enacting and retaining these kinds of statutes, legislatures
have essentially decided that sticking to PA principles is less
189. Lummi Indian Nation v. State, 241 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Wash. 2010) (citing
State v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1247 (Wash. 1998)).
190. Id. at 1231 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.140(2)(d)).
191. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (2006) (providing for water rights for
municipalities and other public water suppliers based on 40-year planning
horizon); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.230 (2005) (giving municipalities a standard period
of 20 years-instead of the 5 years allowed for other uses-to complete
construction activities under a water supply permit, and allowing for extensions of
that twenty-year period under certain conditions); Christopher H. Meyer,
Municipal Water Rights and the Growing Communities Doctrine,WATER REPORT,
Mar. 15, 2010, at 1, 4-8 (describing 1996 Idaho municipal water rights statute,
including provision allowing water rights to be held by municipalities for
"reasonably anticipated future needs" as defined in section 42-202B(8) of the
Idaho Code).
192. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.545(1)(d) (2009) (groundwater permit exemption for
"[s]ingle or group domestic purposes" using up to 15,000 gallons per day); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2011) (same, with limit of five thousand gallons per day).
The Montana water code generally exempts small groundwater uses of no more
than thirty-five gallons per minute and ten acre-feet per year, and agency
implementation of this exemption is the source of ongoing controversy in that
state. See Declaratory Ruling on Petition to Amend Rule 36.12.101(13) (Mont.
Dep't
of
Natural
Res.
Aug.
17,
2010),
available
at
http://www.dnrc.mt.gov/wrd/declaratory-ruling/declaratory ruling.pdf
(declaratory ruling regarding agency interpretation of scope of small-scale well
exemption).
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important than assuring adequate water supplies for growing
cities and for landowners' domestic needs. 193 The fact that
some such statutes have been around for many years-the New
Mexico domestic well law, for example, was first enacted in
1953194 -only shows that the ongoing exodus from PA is not a
recent development. In reality, the western states have been
quietly moving away from PA for many years, abandoning it in
stages.
I wrote in 1998 that the Pacific Northwest states followed
a policy of maintaining the status quo-that is, preserving
established water uses, even when such uses should have been
curtailed under established state water law. 195 That article
identified the Idaho conjunctive management rules, then
relatively new, as a prime example of a state seeking to
maintain status quo water uses in spite of the "first in time,
first in right" principle and IDWR's mandatory duty to
administer water by priority. 196 Another example was the

enactment in Montana and Washington of statutes that
allowed water users to file claims in ongoing water right
adjudications after the original statutory filing deadline,
effectively reviving time-barred claims for existing uses.

19 7

The Lummi and Bounds cases, however, do not quite fit
the model of states protecting status quo water uses. The
Washington Supreme Court upheld a statute that preserved
existing water right certificates, but not necessarily existing
uses; indeed, the main beneficiaries of the law would be those
who had never beneficially used a portion of their allocated
water, and were, therefore, at risk of losing that portion. 198 The
New Mexico domestic well statute, of course, protects those
who have neither an existing use nor any form of water right,
but who may want to drill a new well. 199 Both these statutes
could leave some existing users worse off than they would be
193. Domestic well exemptions may also be justified based on the small size of
each individual use, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1.1 (2003), and on the
administrative burden that would be imposed by requiring a full-blown permit
review process for thousands of domestic well applications each year. But as the
cumulative effect of pumping by thousands of (individually small) users becomes
known, the states can no longer pretend that domestic wells present no real
concerns for surface flows and senior users. See Bossert, supra note 147.
194. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
195. Benson, supra note 67.
196. Id. at 895-96.
197. Id. at 897.
198. See supra Part III.A.2.
199. See supra Part III.A.3.
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under established PA principles, as acknowledged by the
courts. 200
These two statutes are best understood not as maintaining
existing uses, but as preserving a perceived right of access to
water. The Washington Legislature acted to ensure that the
water suppliers with "pumps and pipes" certificates did not lose
any of their paper entitlements, which probably seemed secure
to them prior to Theodoratus.20 1 New Mexico's domestic well
law ensures that property owners have continued access to the
groundwater beneath their land for purposes of meeting their
basic household needs-access they have enjoyed for decades,
predating even the 1953 statute. 202 These statutes are
therefore similar to those creating exceptions to the forfeiture
rule, which otherwise provides that failure to use water for a
fixed period of years will result in loss of the right. 203 Unlike
PA-which vigilantly protects existing beneficial uses-all of
these statutes benefit those who believe they have a right to a
certain quantity of water, even though they have not been
using all (or perhaps any) of that water.
The Idaho conjunctive management rules do benefit
existing (junior) users, and thus at least can reasonably claim
to further the maximum beneficial use of water resources. 204
But promoting this underlying goal of PA sometimes means
clashing with the core principles of PA, 205 and the Idaho rules
200. See supra notes 144, 167 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
202. See Bounds v. State, 2011-NMCA-011, 149 N.M. 484, 252 P.3d 708 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2010) (noting 1953 domestic well statute codified pre-existing
administrative practice of exempting certain groundwater applications from
permit requirement), cert. granted sub nom. Bounds v. Dantonio, 2011-NMCERT001, 263 P.3d 902 (2011), and cert. granted sub nom. N.M. Livestock v. State
Eng'r, 2011-NMCERT-001, 263 P.3d 902 (2011).
203. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-28 (2002) (providing for loss of water right
after four years of nonuse, but providing multiple exceptions to the usual rule);
Krista Koehl, PartialForfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon Compromises Traditional
Principles to Achieve Flexibility, 28 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1142-46 & n.67 (1998)
(explaining "use it or lose it" principle and Oregon statutory exceptions; listing 13
exceptions to the usual rule in section 540.610 of Oregon's revised statutes).
204. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 37.03.11.010.07 (2011) (defining "[flull
[e]conomic [d]evelopment of [u]nderground [w]ater [r]esources"); id. r.
37.03.11.020.03 (2011) (incorporating "full economic development" principle into
"reasonable use" requirement).
205. See, e.g., Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529
P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1974) (denying request for new appropriation, free from priority
calls, based on clearing water-wasting streamside vegetation, despite arguments
that recognizing such appropriations would promote beneficial use of water and
would cause no harm to senior users).
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do just that, effectively replacing IDWR's mandatory duty to
enforce priorities with a complex framework that allows the
agency to consider many factors and choose various remedies in
response to a priority call. 206 Groundwater users may see that
as entirely fair, because for many years they pumped without
ever being subjected to a call, which surely caused many to
believe that their uses would not be curtailed for the sake of
surface water users regardless of priority. In this respect, then,
all three of the recent cases have the same result: they all
preserve continued access to water for those who had an
expectation of that access, even if PA would not have recognized
a right to ongoing access or use.
Thus, not only do all three cases depart from PA, they go in
the same direction, away from the principles that impose
specific restrictions on water usage for certain purposes. By
upholding statutes and rules that ease those restrictions, the
cases accept that water rights may be created or protected in
ways that classic PA would not allow. The cases also recognize
that such laws may disadvantage existing (junior or senior)
users who would be better protected by PA, but that effect does
not necessarily render the laws invalid, even in states where
PA is written into the constitution. For those water users who
perceive that they will be disadvantaged-such as the
disappointed plaintiffs in American Falls, Lummi, and
Bounds-the western states' move away from PA is clearly a
problem. The benefited users, of course, would see it
differently. But the larger question, to which the conclusion
turns, is whether this move should be seen as a good thing or a
bad thing for water policy in the West.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALL OF PRIOR
APPROPRIATION

This Article has shown how Prior Appropriation has lost
its hold over western water law as courts have upheld
deviations from even the most fundamental PA principles, even
in states with PA provisions in their constitutions. From a
policy standpoint, that is a positive development-that is, in
general and on balance, the states' willingness to depart from
PA is likely to benefit water policy. Western water law has long
been criticized for its various shortcomings, and despite some
206.

See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
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recent progress, the states have made only limited headway in
resolving them. 207 Letting go of PA may liberate the states to
enact stronger policies to address its failures, such as
promoting efficiency and flexibility in water use, protecting
public values such as recreation and environmental quality,
and strengthening state authority to manage water.
Of course, this new freedom from PA may also allow the
states to move in the opposite direction, making it legally
easier to secure water rights for consumptive, more-or-less
private uses without regard for impacts on other users or the
sustainability of the resource. The New Mexico domestic well
law and the Bounds decision do exactly that; the Washington
statute upheld in Lummi arguably does too, by expanding the
universe of "municipal" water suppliers and preventing
scrutiny of their potentially unused water rights. 208 If the
states depart from PA only to make it easier for people to
obtain or retain entitlements to consume water, they will make
things worse rather than better-especially as the effects of
climate change make it increasingly difficult to balance the
West's water supplies and demands. 209
The question is whether the western legislatures will
enact-and the courts will uphold-statutes that move in the
other direction by protecting public values, providing
flexibility, advancing efficiency, or promoting forward-looking
water management in ways that PA would not. The widespread
legal recognition of instream flows is cause for optimism, or at
least an indication that positive reforms are indeed possible.
Colorado offers an encouraging example in this regard, and
not simply because the legislature enacted an instream flow
statute that its supreme court upheld as constitutional. 210
207. See Getches, supra note 7, at 23-42 (describing limited progress toward
western water reforms in the 1990s).
208. In fairness to the Washington statute, it also established certain water
conservation requirements for municipal water suppliers. See H.R. 1338, 58th
Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2003); Sarah E. Mack, Washington's Municipal Water
Law Upheld by State Supreme Court, 15 W. WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 35, 36 (2010).
Thus, the measure arguably advanced progressive water policy goals as well as
addressing the concerns of developers and cities.
209. The literature regarding the effects of climate change on western water is
extensive. For a recent article dealing with both the projected impacts and the
legal and policy implications, see Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing
Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 3 (2010).
210. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd.,
594 P.2d 570, 574-75 (Colo. 1979) (upholding Colorado's 1973 instream flow
statute known as Senate Bill 97).
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Colorado has beneficially used this authority to develop a
relatively robust instream flow program, establishing protected
levels in over 1,900 stream segments and lakes by 2005-more
than in any other state. 211 Moreover, Colorado has taken steps
to revise its laws and invest resources, clearing away obstacles
to instream flow protection and restoration. 212 Although
Colorado's instream flow program is certainly not an
unqualified success, and further revisions could improve its
effectiveness, 213 it shows that western states are capable of
reforming their water laws and programs to address the
chronic deficiencies of PA.
A related question is whether western state water agencies
will take actions that deviate from PA in the absence of specific
legislative direction to do so, and whether the courts will
uphold such actions. Here there may be less reason for
optimism, given that state water officials in the West have
rarely been famous for taking risks-especially for the sake of
protecting public values. 214
Idaho's conjunctive management rules are one example of
an agency taking action without specific statutory
authorization, but IDWR was already between a rock and hard
place after Musser v. Higginson. And when the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld the rules in American Falls, the primary

211. SASHA CHARNEY, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., DECADES DOWN THE
ROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAMS IN COLORADO AND THE

WESTERN UNITED STATES 18 tbl. 15 (2005), http://cwcb.state.co.us/publicinformation/publications/Documents/ReportsStudies/ISFCompStudyFinalRpt.pdf.
Oregon was next with 1,550 protected reaches and lakes as of 2005; no other state
had as many as 500 at that time. Id.
212. See Reed D. Benson, 'Adequate Progress," or Rivers Left Behind?
Developments in Colorado and Wyoming Instream Flow Laws Since 2000, 36
ENVTL. L. 1283, 1302-03 (2006).
213. Id. at 1304-09.
214. See Neuman, supra note 28, at 961 (noting that state water agencies play
a largely passive role as to existing water uses, and "do not actively seek to define
and enforce against waste or inefficient water use .

. .

. The agencies do not go

looking for either forfeiture or waste but simply react to the worst of the
complaints brought to them"); Benson, supra note 212, at 1301-02 (describing
how Wyoming State Engineer Pat Tyrrell denied the Town of Pinedale's request
to transfer some of its water to instream use-even though the transfer would not
have harmed any other water user-based on a narrow interpretation of
Wyoming's instream flow statute). Statutory provisions requiring new permits or
transfers to accord with the "public interest" offer another example of state
agencies' reluctance to use their authority. See generally Reed D. Benson, Public
on Paper: The Failureof Law to Protect Public Water Uses in the Western United
States, 1 INT'L J. RURAL L. & POL'Y, no. 1, 2011, at 1, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1984062.
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beneficiaries were the private groundwater users who had
intervened in the case. In contrast, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals recently struck down key portions of the State
Engineer's "Active Water Resource Management" rules geared
toward strengthening the agency's powers to administer
priorities in times of shortage; the court held that the rules
exceeded the State Engineer's statutory authority, even though
the legislature had specifically directed him to adopt rules to
address the serious lack of water management in
unadjudicated basins. 215 The court insisted that the legislature
could have authorized the state engineer to adopt the rules
that he did, but found that it had failed to do so in "direct,
clear, and certain terms" 216-effectively negating an express
legislative directive, and blocking the responsible agency from
applying its expertise to address the critical problem of water
management.
One thing is clear: the state legislatures can now choose to
reshape water law to address the problems facing the West
today, and tomorrow, without too much concern for the
constraints traditionally imposed by PA principles. In making
those choices, legislators may be influenced by the expectations
created during the years when PA prevailed as state water law,
or by the loyal support that PA still has in the agricultural
community, especially. 217 But those are political arguments; as
a legal doctrine, PA has lost its force. Like the centenarian who
founded the company but now has only an honorific title, Prior
Appropriation has more symbolic importance than practical
influence. In today's western water law, old Prior may still be
alive, but he is no longer in charge.

215. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. D'Antonio, 2011-NMCA015, 249 P.3d 932, 939-43 (N.M. App. Ct. 2010), cert. granted, 2011-NMCERT002, 150 N.M. 617, 264 P.3d 129 (2011). The legislature had passed a 2003 statute
declaring that "the adjudication process is slow, the need for water administration
is urgent, compliance with interstate compacts is imperative and the [S]tate
[E]ngineer has authority to administer water allocations in accordance with . . .
priorities," id. at 935 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9.1(A) (2003)) (alteration in
the original), and directing the state engineer to adopt rules for priority
administration, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2-9.1(B). The court held, however, that the
legislature had misperceived the state engineer's existing authority. Tri-State
Generation& TransmissionAss'n, 2011-NMCA-015, 249 P.3d at 937-39.
216. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, 2011-NMCA-015, 249 P.3d at
at 942.
217. See Tarlock, supra note 15, at 885-86.

